Author(s)
Tin Tin Htar Myint
Can you begin by describing the current general and humanitarian situation in Myanmar and how this has come to be?
The crisis in Myanmar is both a human rights crisis and a humanitarian crisis. It is rooted in the civil war that has pitted ethnic minorities against the Burmese army for over 70 years, and the oppression of civilians by the military that has caused a great deal of hardship since 1962.
The latest and most disastrous coup d’état in Myanmar’s history took place on 1 February 2021. The peaceful demonstrations in the following weeks were quickly and violently crushed by the armed forces. The Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM), which was supported by a large number of health workers, teachers and civil servants, had a considerable impact and weakened all public sectors, particularly education, health and transport. Following this brutal repression, many opponents fled to the “free” border areas. As a result, more than 50% of the country is no longer under the control of the military regime, but rather that of either a local administration, an opposition government (NUG – National Unity Government) or ethnic organisations (Karen, Kachin, Chin, Bamar and Rakhine).
In September 2021, the NUG declared a war of resistance alongside the ethnic organisations. In 2023, the crisis escalated further, and by the end of July 2023 there had been over 14,000 armed clashes and more than 1,000 air strikes (see Map 1). It is currently estimated that around 1.9 million people have been displaced, including 1.6 million inside the country, and that around 75,000 civilian properties have been burnt or destroyed since 1 February 2021, including houses and places of worship. Around 17.6 million people are in need of humanitarian aid (see Map 2), i.e. one in three members of the population, around four million children are no longer attending school and only 45% have received the first dose of the D-T-Polio vaccine (35% for the third dose).
Finally, in May 2023, Cyclone Mocha (the country’s worst natural disaster for more than a decade), and the flooding experienced during the monsoon season, further amplified humanitarian needs throughout Myanmar.
In such a context, can aid be neutral?
The main causes of the humanitarian crisis in Myanmar include human rights violations, repression and war crimes. Trying to reduce the humanitarian crisis without addressing these problems is tantamount to ignoring and even accepting these crimes and violations. Myanmar’s agony is palpable, and though the civil war had a major impact on the country, the events of 2021 are of a completely different nature: this is neither a war nor a struggle between political or ethnic organisations, but the uprising of an entire people against an illegitimate junta in power. The military regime is now persecuting its own people with extreme violence, bombing schoolchildren during school hours and civilians during religious festivities, imprisoning children to blackmail parents who have taken part in demonstrations, not to mention the arrests of medical personnel who come to help the wounded, the restrictions imposed on humanitarian vehicles (the need for travel permits) and the blocking of humanitarian aid. What is currently taking place behind closed doors in the country is much more than political or ideological confrontation: this is utterly cruel and barbaric.
In the case of Myanmar, respecting the principles of neutrality or impartiality would therefore be contrary to the values of humanity. There is a risk that humanitarian organisations who collaborate with such a brutal regime will be manipulated, as the military junta is desperate for the international community to recognise its legitimacy. Any form of collaboration is effectively seen as a sign of approval of the barbarity committed by the military and is in no way neutral. As the entire people have clearly rejected this regime since February 2021, collaboration is contrary to their will. In this context, neutrality is neither viable nor ethical. It cannot lead to peace because, not only would it fail to address the fundamental cause of the crisis, but it would be totally counterproductive.
How is international aid currently delivered in Myanmar?
Traditional non-governmental and international organisations are unable to take action in the areas where there is armed conflict, where needs are huge. Humanitarian aid is trickling through, as are the local people trying to flee danger. The regime has put in place a strategy known as the “4 cuts”: cuts in food, funds, information and recruitment. In addition, international non-governmental organisations are subject to even stricter administrative regulations. As a result, in the first quarter of 2023, only 1.4 million people received humanitarian aid (31% of the 2023 humanitarian response plan target). In the case of Cyclone Mocha, travel permits were suspended in the affected areas, particularly for access to minority ethnic groups and the Rohingya. Employees’ activities and movements are scrupulously monitored. Food lorries could not get to where they were needed, despite being under the control of the military. What is more, by the end of July, only 25% of the funds required had been received after Cyclone Mocha. And, with the new law for non-profit organisations that came into force at the end of 2022, there is more and more risk of intimidation and reprisals against employees’ families.
What is the role of the Burmese diaspora in humanitarian aid today?
First and foremost, the Burmese diaspora is the primary source of information and witness accounts about the crisis. Personal messages via social networks, as well as images and information, are shared widely. As a result, the “outside” world is kept informed of the situation almost in real time, including about regions where the Internet and roads are systematically cut off. War zones are inaccessible to foreign and local journalists, who are constantly hounded by the military. The accounts and information gathered by citizen-journalists on the ground and relayed by the various Burmese diasporas make it possible to continuously assess the scale of the crisis and how it is evolving.
The second major activity of the diaspora is fundraising for humanitarian aid. This can take several forms: tombolas, auctions or ‘simple’ donations. Money is often collected by support groups or associations. The money is transferred by “Hundi”, an Indian transfer system that converts donations in euros into kyats (the Burmese currency). This is done through a foreign exchange agent with a bank account in euros in Europe and another in kyat in Myanmar. The agent pays the equivalent in kyat of the sum donated in euros to a local agent, if it is an association or organisation, or directly to the beneficiaries. Transfers between Burmese accounts are currently being scrupulously monitored and the slightest suspicion can result in years in prison or torture. As a result, transfers between Burmese bank accounts are made in small amounts to several accounts. And in villages without a banking system, money is transferred to local businesses where villagers can collect sacks of rice, oil and other basic goods. Today, this is almost the only way to get aid into conflict zones.
The health and education systems have been severely affected by the coup d’état and the repression. Moreover, because the civil disobedience movement was started by doctors and healthcare workers, they have become the military’s prime targets. As a result, many doctors have left their families and towns to go into hiding or to liberated areas. In the towns and villages affected by bombings and fires, hospitals and schools have often been targeted. As a result, these refugees, who previously worked as public sector healthcare workers and schoolteachers, have become volunteers in war zones providing healthcare and teaching. They work in collaboration with their colleagues in the diasporas, who give online courses and provide materials and medicines.
To conclude, how should traditional humanitarian organisations and the Burmese diaspora work together?
Faced with the situations and challenges described above, the most important thing is that international organisations work directly with local organisations, i.e. without going through their local branches. These local organisations have the advantage of direct access to the population and better knowledge of the terrain. However, most of them were set up after the coup d’état and have not been legally registered. Due to a lack of resources and experience, they do not have the capacity to set up major projects or comply with all the regulations usually required by the major donors. The members of these organisations often use pseudonyms for security reasons and have no direct contact with international organisations.
As for local branches of international organisations, despite their experience and skills, they do not have access to the target population. Their activities are therefore very limited. What is more, under the new law, it is no longer possible for them to work with local organisations, as this would compromise the safety of the people involved.
For its part, the diaspora – thanks to its networks – can help to establish links between the field and international organisations. It can help to find appropriate local groups for international organisations’ missions. It can also take part in defining projects to ensure that they meet local needs while complying as closely as possible with the rules required by international organisations. In addition, the diaspora can help to find solutions for transferring funds and can take part in discussions with partners on how international organisations could relax certain rules that are not adapted to this kind of situation. Therefore, there are various ways in which actors, including diasporas, can work together to implement humanitarian projects in difficult-to-reach areas. The golden rules of pragmatism are outlined below (illustration 2). Finally, in a humanitarian impasse such as the one in Myanmar, the diaspora can play a fundamental role as a pragmatic and necessary intermediary between humanitarian actors and the population who are in desperate need.
Golden rules
- Small-scale organisations (particularly local CSOs)
- Quick decision-making
- Work with the diaspora as much as possible as an intermediary and/or for governance.
- Start with small, short-term projects
- Transparent, honest and fast assessments
- Continue and increase the budget depending on the results/ the context
- All actors understand the strengths and weaknesses of all the partners
- Accept uncertainty and the risk of error (10% margin)
Pages
p. 70-79.