A number of actors have developed specific approaches to difficult contexts where there are severe constraints in terms of temperature and humidity, and where there is a limited supply of energy, spare parts and maintenance support. These variously are ‘systems’ engineers, prospecting geologists in deserts or ice-covered areas, special operation military forces (who need to survive and operate without drawing attention to themselves) and health sector organisations in extremely poor countries where there is no infrastructure (energy, evacuation systems, etc.). The aim for these actors is to increase the resilience of their teams and their equipment in contexts that are durably complex. Though each has developed their approach separately, they share a number of common characteristics. In particular, the resilience that they aim to establish is necessarily based on three key concepts: robustness, having backup options, and the ability to work in degraded mode.

For our part, during our numerous missions in the field, we have seen how little resilience the humanitarian system has: without communication, the essential functions of modern data collection, coordination and accountability become paralysed. Without energy, the basic tools for sending people and goods to emergency areas, the evacuation of those who need to be resettled, the provision of emergency healthcare (managing poly-traumatised patients and using medical imaging), and the supply of clean water become impossible or unusable.

Three key issues : robustness, redundancy and a the capacity to function in degraded mode

Robustness, so that the system does not break and put the operation and the survival of the victims in danger.

Anyone who has worked in a developing country, without even speaking of crisis contexts, will have seen cemeteries of farming equipment, biomedical equipment or computers in ministry courtyards or the warehouses of too many projects. Unfortunately, there are many examples of this kind: fragile equipment requiring sophisticated maintenance and costly spare parts, etc.; second-hand hospital equipment that cannot be repaired without well-equipped biomedical engineers; vehicles propped up on supports because there are no spare tyres, etc. Humanitarian actors themselves often use sophisticated equipment that is difficult to repair in the field due to the short duration of their operations (the durability of the equipment is not necessarily seen as an important factor as there are lives to save in the short term) and the significant resources at their disposal (when something breaks down a replacement can be ordered). This equipment is generally left behind when the operation ends, leaving local actors with the hope that they will be able to reuse it, but above all, with the responsibility of dealing with this broken equipment that is sometimes dangerous to store. Robustness is rarely the main criteria for choosing equipment, other than for 4-wheel drive vehicles, which are essential to move around in the field and for which humanitarians there often have very precise criteria in terms of robustness (others, such as those who are based in capital cities, tend to give priority to comfort).

Redundancy, or the ability to have backup solutions

Port-au-Prince (Haiti), January 2010: a few days after the earthquake, a UN staff walking in the MINUSTAH’s car park at the airport heard the following call coming from a car radio: “Hello Port-au-Prince, this is Jacmel, do you receive me? What is happening over there? There’s quite a bit of damage here!” This was the first time that contact had been made between the two sides of the Mornes. For a number of years, everyone in Haiti had begun to use mobile phones and high frequency radio was only used for certain security procedures during displacements. As would be the case a few years later following hurricane Matthew in Jérémie, the telecom system was wiped out by the 2010 earthquake. It was a fragile system, without the possibility of redundancy (no plan B if the communication plan A did not work, and without a high frequency radio communication system using solar panels, as had existed in the past), as well as problems operating in a reduced function mode. After the 2010 earthquake, there was no organised capacity to manage extreme situations: the Haitian Civil Protection force was very weak at the time, without the capacity to engage in triage of the casualties around the healthcare facilities, and the state hospital system was in a very degraded state and had been replaced by a private system that only the elite could afford. After hurricane Matthew, several days were needed before the affected area was able to communicate with the capital, the DIGICEL aerials having been blown over, the bridges destroyed, and high frequency radio still not in working order. Luckily, the prevention message got through before the hurricane arrived, often via national radio and television channels, telling the population to store water, food and tarpaulins to protect them from the rain, and, above all, to make their way to protected sites before the hurricane hit (but not to move once it had).

The ability to operate in degraded mode

The human body provides us with the perfect example of what a backup mode is. As a very complex biological system with internal mechanisms regulating its multiple functions, it shuts down what is not essential when it is under stress. Thus, when immersed in cold water, the human body will use all its energy to save its brain, heart and liver, but will consider all the rest to be superfluous. We can also learn from surgery in disaster contexts, which has been influenced by surgery in war contexts, and has become very sophisticated. For today’s armies, every person should be saved. On the battlefield, where it is not really possible to treat a patient, the objective of modern medicine is therefore to stabilize the injured person, to prepare them so that they can be transported, and then to send them to a ‘state of the art’ technical platform where they can be treated with all the sophistication of modern surgery. Mass Casualty Management techniques are therefore taught less and less in medical schools in developed countries. As a result, when the military or NGOs deploy young surgeons, they have difficulty working without all the observation equipment (medical imaging) and parameter sensors that they are used to. In contrast, NGOs who employ surgeons who are older or who are from Africa and who are used to working in these conditions are relatively effective. These surgeons know how to examine a patient without the expensive, fragile and sophisticated medical imaging equipment that does not last long in humid, dusty contexts with an irregular electrical current: equipment is damaged when the current is too high or too low, or when it alternates between too high and too low, and images are distorted when there is insufficient current, making the information they contain inaccurate. We have also seen in many contexts that designing tools that are capable of working in backup mode depends to a great extent on developing modularity which allows a tool to be adapted on a case by case basis depending on the tasks to be carried out, and the constraints and risks involved. Emergency hospitals provide some interesting lessons in this respect. Is it really necessary to have all the possible functions, which, in turn, requires the capacity to generate energy, fluids, and analyses to be transported in and out, as well as the means of securing all this in the field? Or is it possible to decide, on a case by case basis, the minimum that is needed and that can be integrated into existing bodies?

In this context, the different collapse scenarios raise a certain number of questions for humanitarian actors.

What of ‘technological’ humanitarian aid with regard to the collapse scenarios?

Technology and connectivity have allowed a whole range of data collection and processing tools to emerge, such as tablets equipped with KoBo or other similar software. Whereas in the past, priority was given to experience, analysis and dialogue, today the aim is to be ‘data driven’. Now, all major NGOs have systems that can transfer data in real time (if connected by telecoms) or in delayed mode (as soon as staff return to the ‘base’ and its Wi-Fi connection) as if transmission speed, in itself, was a guarantee of quality. We often forget that these tools have biases (such as the fact that the quality of what they produce depends essentially on the quality of the information and the instructions that they receive), and as a result we overlook the need to screen the reliability of our information. What is more, these technologies contribute to de-humanising the sector: affected people have reported to us on several occasions that those who collect data no longer look at the people that they are questioning, and they no longer speak to them, simply asking questions and entering the data on their tablets. Forty years ago already, in his wonderful book, ‘Farmer First’, which was one of the first to explore participatory approaches, Robert Chambers introduced two key principles: optimal ignorance (what really needs to be known to make the right decisions), and appropriate imprecision (it is better to be 80% right on time than 100% too late). The sector has clearly forgotten the first principle by building what often turns out to be data cemeteries, and does not apply the second, often holding up decision-making because the analysis takes longer than planned. But, above all, the sector places itself in a position of complete dependency vis-à-vis data transfer and processing systems which are actually extremely fragile: data centres, web hosts, data banks and clouds will no doubt be the first to be affected if there is an energy crisis as they are so dependent on it!

The increase in the amount of technology in the aid sector comes from the search for greater effectiveness and accountability. If systems were to collapse, it would very quickly affect two important new humanitarian sectors: cash transfer mechanisms and biometric recording systems. The first of these is developing quickly thanks to mobile banks and their multiple cash transfer options, both in their ‘routine’ mode (social security nets) and in emergency contexts (cash transfers), including via mixed tools (social security nets that are reactive to shocks that allow transfers to be increased to previously identified vulnerable people if there is a food crisis). Cash transfers are also becoming more common due to vouchers, including e-vouchers, which are almost bank cards with accounts set up by aid agencies for each beneficiary. These systems require effective control mechanisms which increasingly use bio-data (iris recognition, fingerprints, etc.). As such, the humanitarian sector is venturing into a very sensitive area regarding the protection of privacy (particularly as these operations generally take place in contexts where there are crises or very poor governance), as well as placing itself in a position of complete dependency with regard to energy and communication flows, and these would very quickly be affected if systems were to collapse.

All the points covered above therefore raise the issue of the simplicity and the robustness of aid methods as an area to explore or even as an essential path to take for the future. An interesting sector to analyse is search and rescue in damaged urban environments (bombed cities, urban areas affected by disasters such as earthquakes or hurricanes). Indeed, technological innovations have been developed which can save a great deal of lives thanks to the use of video probes, infra-red radars and sonars to find pockets where there might be survivors. But the key to rescuing people often remains the capacity to clear rubble block after block, often with the help of ‘human chains’. Sophisticated equipment can be deployed, but the key to saving lives remains the capacity of teams to work at night, in the rain, in extremely difficult and trying conditions, with crowbars, wheelbarrows and struts. As such, the organisation the women and men working in rotation, the intelligence of the leadership per zone, the supply of water and food, and the establishment of minimal infrastructure allowing the rescuers to rest a little, are as important – if not more – than sophisticated body detection technology. And these measures will continue to function without the complex contribution from drones, connectivity and energy flows: in short, they are collapse-compatible.

Conclusion

No one knows how global systems will collapse, nor even if they will collapse. Will human beings find an energy-based solution that will allow them to overcome the dangers and risks presented above so that they do not need to take the ‘frugal’ route? Or will they be forced to emancipate themselves from these ever more complex, digital and connected trends? Will they find a route towards resilient systems: robustness, the development of redundancy options and the ability to work in degraded mode?
All this might seem a question of common sense, including for those who work on a daily basis in and on crisis situations, that is to say, very fragile and degraded environments, but alas, this is far from being the case. The siren song of technological innovation is often louder than that of social innovation. There are now a great number of ‘innovation labs’ and organisations who produce software and applications for the humanitarian sector. The wakeup call could be brutal

François Grünewald – Groupe URD
Executive Director