The two earthquakes that hit Syria and Turkey on 6 February are among the most deadly disasters to have taken place in recent decades. Though the region is very exposed to seismic risk and the activity of the East Anatolian fault, there had not been such a powerful earthquake for almost 200 years. Nevertheless, Turkey is a tectonic ‘hot spot’ and the Izmit earthquake in 1999 claimed 15 000 lives. Since the beginning of 2023, repeated tremors and continuous seismic activity in Lebanon should have drawn attention to the risk of a major event.[1]

While the frequency of seismic activity at the national level could have helped to establish a strong national memory, a culture of risk and an awareness of seismic risk, the human toll here was the result of pre-existing weaknesses, and numerous factors pointed to an unprecedented disaster.

In Syria, the earthquakes put extra pressure on an already limited humanitarian response, preventing the rapid deployment of humanitarian aid and emergency relief in the initial hours of the disaster. Moreover, the Syrian crisis has led to the displacement of almost 3.7 million Syrians[2] into Turkey, mainly in the region of Gaziantep, near the epicentre of the earthquakes. These displaced people were therefore more exposed and vulnerable to a major event.

In parallel, due to rapid, unplanned, and sometimes spontaneous urban development, the infrastructure and buildings in the region are fragile. This urban development has not applied earthquake resistant principles, nor has it applied a ‘risk zoning’ approach. Unscrupulous property speculators and promoters took advantage of a situation where standards were not strictly imposed and where there was widespread corruption among builders. This led to urban development and buildings that were unsuited to an environment with seismic activity.

The whole Turkish system appears to have been defective.[3] In a general atmosphere of corruption and incompetence, compliance with earthquake resistant norms was not being monitored, despite warnings and criticisms about the inaction of the authorities in their management of housing construction policy.[4]

The same problems existed on the Syrian side, with the added complications due to conflicts and military activities which had already weakened buildings, as in Aleppo and Idlib.

This led to colossal damage, with a large number of buildings collapsing and the heightened risk of sinking due to the phenomenon of soil liquefaction. This meant that the emergency response had to take place in a chaotic environment with people and local actors unsure about the state of the buildings still standing.

Once again, this disaster echoes the numerous lessons that have been learned in similar post-earthquake contexts such as Haiti, Lebanon and Nepal.[5] The following feedback and recommendations are presented as a basis for discussion and to help prepare for and respond to future earthquakes.

 

[1] Since the beginning of 2023, there have been a dozen notable seismic events. https://sismique.zone/turquie

[2] UNHCR (2022, 15 mars) Eleven years on, mounting challenges push many displaced Syrians to the brink. https://reliefweb.int/report/syrian-arab-republic/eleven-years-mounting-challenges-push-many-displaced-syrians-brink-enar

[3] France Info (2023, 8 February). Séisme en Turquie : “C’est une faute du système” car “en Turquie, les contrôles des bâtiments n’existent pas”, dénonce un architecte turc. https://www.francetvinfo.fr/meteo/seisme/seisme-en-turquie-c-est-une-faute-du-systeme-car-en-turquie-les-controles-des-batiments-n-existent-pas-denonce-un-architecte-turc_5645969.html

[4] Sky News Australia (2023, 13 February) ‘Corruption and incompetence’ at fault for buildings collapsing in Turkey. https://www.skynews.com.au/world-news/global-affairs/corruption-and-incompetence-at-fault-for-buildings-collapsing-in-turkey/video/6621e5209e38ad463c9b8d86276f5d66

[5] Groupe URD has analysed post-earthquake humanitarian responses in many contexts. To find out more, visit the Groupe URD website : https://www.urd.org/en/theme/fragilities-risks-resilience/

 

©European Union, 2023 (photographer: Lisa Hastert)