

**From early warning to reinforcing resilience:  
Lessons learned from the 2011-2012 Sahel response**

**A report for the IASC Principles**

**Dakar/Ndjamena/Niamey/Nouakchott**

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**Final Report**

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## Executive Summary

1. The Sahel region includes some of the poorest countries in the world, with minimal basic services and very low nutrition, health and livelihoods indicators. The population of the Sahel has traditionally been very resilient, with strong social solidarity, in which communities under stress support each other to share limited resources. This resilience has been eroded over the last 20 years by a series of phenomena<sup>1</sup>: rapid demographic growth putting pressure on stressed resources, inequitable economic development, rapid urbanization, uneven governance, etc. People have become increasingly dependent on remittances and, as the region imports a lot of its food needs, on markets that are subject to rapid fluctuations. The decreasing time between shocks is making recovery more difficult and these crises are pushing more people into poverty, contributing to increasing malnutrition and the erosion of coping mechanisms.

### The response

2. The early response was timely, and in some cases large, although there were differences between countries. Early mitigation efforts made in 2011 and early 2012 proved to be an effective and efficient way to reduce suffering and the cost of relief and recovery. The response benefited from the rapid availability of funds like CERF and DREF for the UN and Red Cross, and ad-hoc donor support to support rapid response. Agencies tried relatively early to marry options addressing both urgent needs and elements of a more structural and developmental nature, using “twin track approaches.”
3. Existing humanitarian capacity and experience played a key role. The capacities and experience of the aid sector in the region varies significantly, with countries like Chad and Niger with strong Humanitarian Country Teams and broad humanitarian experience and others like Mali, Mauritania and Senegal, which were focused on development. This impacted significantly the response.
4. Credible early warnings are essential. In the whole Sahel region, alerts and early warnings were timely and contributed to early planning and advocacy. Governments of the region reacted differently, but often promptly. However, early warning systems still focused largely on the production side of the shock and were less able to identify the effects induced by high cereal prices. The debate over differing analyses created a certain degree of confusion, which harmed resource mobilization. This had to be “fixed” rapidly.
5. Proactive planning strengthened assessments and coordination. Strategic planning was prioritized. Yet the ability of country teams operating in a development mode to move to humanitarian response, and set up an HCT and proper coordination mechanisms was uneven. The designation of a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator boosted fund-raising, advocacy and consolidated cooperation with regional institutions. Good donor coordination helped improve coverage and reduce duplication.

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<sup>1</sup> In 2007 OCHA and ALNAP organized a conference in Senegal on “Compounded crises in West Africa”, which reviewed in some details the broad spectrum of risks affecting the sub-region. [http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/22\\_compound\\_crisis.pdf](http://www.alnap.org/pool/files/22_compound_crisis.pdf)

6. The level of preparedness varied in the region and among national authorities and the international presence prior to 2011-2012. Despite improvements in surge capacity and good support from regional offices, it still takes valuable time to establish functioning humanitarian coordination structures, and too long to get new offices up and running.
7. Information Management is key to decision making, resource mobilization, program steering and accountability. Significant efforts have been made to produce data and analysis and to use these for programming and decision making. Yet, there was still disagreement on the severity of the crisis, the speed of the recovery and priority areas. Different assessment methodologies and “entry points” exist, with distinct advantages and disadvantages. Key survey results were sometimes not released quickly due to government sensitivities. Inter-agency dialogue, experience and knowledge of the context are therefore critical to make informed decisions and communicate these clearly.
8. Complex systems require multi-sectoral approaches. There are multiple contributors to a nutritional crises and food insecurity is only one part. Health, water and sanitation, and proper child care practices are equally important and investing only in the food and nutrition component of the response is largely insufficient. Yet the disparity in support to food aid and agriculture, health and WASH is a drag on properly tackling severe and global acute malnutrition and strengthening resilience.
9. Managing the crippling effects of a nutrition crisis requires sustained commitment. Although the 2012 harvest looks favorable, households have not fully recovered. Many will feel the effects of this crisis for an extended period, as pre-crisis vulnerabilities, and crisis induced destitution and indebtedness hinder recovery for another year, not including the impact of any other crisis. This requires at least medium term planning, and the multi-year 2013+ CAP in Chad is a good initiative.
10. From rural to urban. Crises in the rural sector often trigger rapid and sometime irreversible movements to the urban centers, increasing the burden on often already fragile city slums. This issue is rarely noted in analysis on the current crisis in the Sahel belt and even less acted upon, apart from specific efforts in Nouakchott, Mauritania. It should be further explored and its repercussion properly analyzed and taken into account.
11. South-south cooperation. Many important experiences and operational solutions have been developed in the Horn of Africa. Exposure of government officials for West Africa to mechanisms such as safety nets in Ethiopia, destocking programs in Kenya and Cash transfer in the Horn might help broadening the tool box of solutions they can envisage.
12. Learn from the crisis: Crises offer good opportunities to review factors of vulnerability, evaluate responses and consider what to do differently to prevent, mitigate, respond better and strengthen resilience. Exchanges at country or regional levels by the regional DRR Task Force, ROWCA and the Cash Learning projects are good practices to be taken into account.

### **Strengthening resilience in Sahel**

13. The rise of the ‘R’ word in recent year’s opens new ways to think about coordination. It is an opportunity to design multi-dimensional interventions and to re-explore the links between disaster risk reduction, the humanitarian response, and the recovery from crisis and

risk informed development. Actors in the region see the current momentum around resilience as an opportunity to strengthen these links and address institutional barriers that impede coherence between development and humanitarian programming. The resilience debate and focus on mid-to-long term action should however not come at the expense of resources required for urgent need.

14. Donor representatives and implementing agencies highlighted that funding procedures often impede resilience friendly projects. Although there were a number of good examples of ad-hoc solutions and flexibility from donors, as well as growing coordination between development and humanitarian donors, there is a need to address this systemic constraint. Donors should review existing funding channels to support more integrated projects that address humanitarian needs and strengthen community resilience.
15. Managing security: While the situation is improving in Eastern Chad, the effects of the war in Libya, the ongoing crisis in Mali and the increasing instability in Northern Nigeria are leading to high levels of uncertainty which can severely affect access to the field and to the affected populations. In all countries of the Sahel region, security assessment and contingency planning efforts are ongoing among governments and international actors to prepare for the worsening of the situation in Mali and neighboring border areas. These necessary exercises unfortunately divert critical capacities from the recovery efforts to the security sector, and managing these increased risks have significant cost implications.

#### **Guiding principles for coherent resilience approaches**

Resilience is a multi-level and multi-stakeholder endeavor. This resilience has to encompass individuals, households, and communities. A resilient international aid system (able to engage strategically, with flexibility and in a sustained manner) and well prepared national institutions (equipped, trained and able to plan ahead) are critically needed. This will create an environment enabling prevention and reduction of structural vulnerabilities, anticipation of risks, timely and effective delivery of humanitarian aid and linkages between emergency response and recovery.

Context matters: “one size fits all” approach to be avoided. The region is very diverse and only customized solutions can work. However, sharing of information and experiences within the region and with areas with similar characteristics (Horn of Africa) will increase understanding of response options.

Pro-resilience strategies of governments and regional institutions must be supported by development agencies and donors. The 3N initiative in Niger, the recently prepared rural strategy in Chad, the inter-sector Emel project in Mauritania, Senegal’s resilience approach, the ECOWAS emergency stock project and AGIR-Sahel are important initiatives that help frame the international response. They show that governments are addressing the growing vulnerabilities in a landscape of frequent shocks.

Proactive interaction between humanitarian aid and development. There are growing efforts to ensure that planning goes beyond the short term funding framework. The AGIR-Sahel initiative, the UN Sahel Resilience plan and donor, agency and organization specific strategies are milestones in that direction. Development donors should be encouraged to engage more strategically with humanitarian actors, to ensure coherence and continuity in their operations and sharing of experience and networks.

## Full report

### A. Introduction

1. This note is the result of a mission<sup>2</sup> in the Sahel undertaken to provide the IASC Principals meeting of 13 December 2012 with lessons learned and forward looking recommendations on building more resilience in the region (TOR attached as annex 1). The team visited Senegal, Chad, Niger and Mauritania from November 1<sup>st</sup> to 17<sup>th</sup> 2012, and the mission itinerary and list of people met are attached as annex 2 and 3.
2. It builds on some evaluation and learning exercises such as the UNICEF Real Time Independent Assessment in Sahel, the FAO lesson learning workshop in Addis-Ababa<sup>3</sup> and numerous NGO studies.
3. This mission was well received and supported by all actors in the field. The office of the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator, the HCT and OCHA offices, the NGO, donor agencies and National Authorities in the visited countries did their utmost for the mission to be successful.
4. The West Africa Sahel region includes some of the poorest countries in the world, lacking the capacity for minimum service delivery and harbouring very low nutrition, health and livelihoods indicators. The population of the Sahel has traditionally been very resilient. This resilience has been eroded over the last 20 years by a series of phenomenon: the fastest population growth in the world<sup>4</sup> that puts stress on vulnerable resources, inequitable economic development in an increasingly globalized economy (especially the world grain market), rapid urbanization, uneven governance, etc. The population has become increasingly dependent on remittances from within and outside Africa and more exposed to rapid price changes and poor functioning markets. The shrinking time span between shocks is making recovery more difficult and significant parts of the population are falling into poverty, with increased level of chronic and severe malnutrition, growing exposure to hazards and decreasing efficiency of coping mechanisms. These crises include; slow onset and recurring food crises linked to repeated droughts, floods linked to extreme events affecting fertile and often highly populated areas, encroachment on coastal areas vital for biodiversity and fishing communities; conflict and the spill-over of conflicts through IDP and refugee crises, with thousands of uprooted people landing in fragile environments (Chad, Mali, Mauritania). The variety and combination of hazards and shocks increase uncertainty, and make the situation especially difficult to manage for the people and institutions of the Sahel. The implications of these crises triggered interactions between rural and urban vulnerabilities and need to be considered in discussions on resilience.

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<sup>2</sup> The mission team was made of an independent team leader and a staff member of OCHA's evaluation section.

<sup>3</sup> UNDG-WCA Meeting : Lessons Learning Review: Early Action and Resilience Activities in the Sahel, 1 November 2012

<sup>4</sup> Annual population growth rates in Sahelian countries average 2.5 to 3.9% per annum, equivalent to a population doubling time of 20-30 years.

5. The region has been affected over the last 10 years by several crises: drought, floods, food price increases, etc, and there has been a slow, uneven but regular improvement of the response capacity in the international, regional and local systems.

## **B. Operational issues: lessons learned in Sahel in 2011-2012**

### **B.1. Disaster risk reduction and level of preparedness in the Sahel region**

6. In the Sahel, just as there are multiple risks, there are large discrepancies in preparedness levels of national authorities. Civil protection agencies have been in place for decades to deal with floods and other rapid onset disasters. Mechanisms to manage desert locust infestations have been developed and regularly used (including in 2012) with the support of FAO and donors.
7. In the past food security was managed through a complex system of food stocks<sup>5</sup> that were in many instances dismantled. Governments are slowly reactivating them (Chad's *Office National des Stocks Alimentaires*, Office SOMIMEX in Mauritania). Most critical in the response are the first (community) and second (national) storage mechanisms, and links to markets. At the regional level, ECOWAS is developing a humanitarian strategy which includes regional stocks for humanitarian interventions and market regulation.
8. The level of preparedness and the UN and NGO presence prior to 2011-2012 varied in the region. A refugee and IDP crisis has been ongoing in Chad since 2004, and a significant food crisis occurred in 2009-2010, and Niger was significantly affected by a nutrition crisis in 2005-6. Therefore, there were very active humanitarian systems with a strong presence of UN agencies, NGO and humanitarian donors and a well-established, if not perfect, coordination system. In Senegal, Mali and Mauritania, the actors were largely operating in a development mode and the humanitarian system was not set up. Despite some improvements in surge capacity, stand-by mechanisms and strong support from regional offices, it still took valuable time to establish functioning humanitarian coordination structures and too long to get offices up and running from scratch. High turnover of staff in key positions was also a problem.
9. The expertise and knowledge of established humanitarian actors in land-locked and logistically challenged countries like Chad and Niger proved especially important during planning and advocacy. These agencies highlighted that it would often take several months between approval of a funding or programmatic decision and the arrival of the goods in the field. Preparedness and anticipation is in these cases of extreme importance.

### **B.2. Early warning and rapid early mobilization**

10. The experiences of the 2005-2006 and the 2009-2010 crises in the Horn of Africa, the difficulty of transforming early warnings into rapid action during these crises and the criticisms of the late response in 2011 were still fresh in people's minds and so the humanitarian community was determined to avoid the same mistakes.

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<sup>5</sup> [http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/tr-first-line-defence-local-food-reserves-sahel-211012-en\\_0.pdf](http://www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/tr-first-line-defence-local-food-reserves-sahel-211012-en_0.pdf)

11. In the whole Sahel region, early warning was timely. Alerts were raised as early as August 2011 when it became clear that rainfall was patchy and insufficient. This prompted early planning, assessments and advocacy. Several governments, including Niger, Mauritania and Burkina, quickly issued public alerts and initiated their own early response. Due to various reasons, others were more hesitant (elections, etc.). Chad nevertheless launched an appeal at the end of December 2011.
12. Public disagreements on the magnitude of the crisis caused some confusion and a lot of tensions. Donors and Authorities were puzzled by inconsistencies and some used this to justify their limited level of engagement. There is a need for a coherent message on early warning based not only on an “instant snap shot” but for proactive scenario planning, linked to a process enabling regular validation or revision. Otherwise, confusion undermines resource mobilization and impedes the mobilization of agencies. Important efforts were made locally to find solutions and compromise to this sensitive issue. One tool that proved effective in early scenario modeling is the “Outcome analysis” based on the Household Economy Analysis (HEA) framework.<sup>6</sup> Outcome analysis data was made available from January 2012 onwards, mainly for Burkina Faso, Mali, Mauritania and Niger (and under pilot mode for Chad, Northern Nigeria and Senegal as well). This is a very powerful tool to anticipate future needs by answering key questions with regards to who to target, and where, when and how much assistance is needed. The HEA approach needs further dissemination and investment, especially by development actors.
13. In all cases, proactive planning and reinforcement of the assessments and coordination became a priority. Yet the capacity of country teams to move to the alert mode and to set up HCTs and proper coordination mechanisms was uneven. Certain countries like Chad and Niger already had a very active HCT and cluster system. There were inconsistencies in how well clusters functioned and worked with national coordination mechanisms. In Niger, the government pro-actively appealed for funds, and the humanitarian community quickly followed by conducting assessments and confirming the situation after the alert. In other countries, such as Senegal, Mali or Mauritania, the establishment of emergency response and coordination mechanisms was much slower. The establishment of a Regional Humanitarian Coordinator gave a boost to the system, including for fund-raising and articulation with regional institutions such as ECOWAS, although not all countries felt its effect the same way. This additional coordination layer should probably remain temporary in order to avoid creating an additional layer of reporting and decision making or diminishing the legitimacy of existing national and regional coordination systems.
14. Regional response planning played a leadership role: Informal technical consultations regarding priority actions were conducted between technicians of main UN/INGO and RC agencies from the end of November 2011 in Dakar. This process also estimated a likely minimum needs scenario and the cost, human resource requirements and logistical constraints and of responding to this scenario. This helped transform the available information and analysis into timely resource mobilization and preparedness. This was

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<sup>6</sup> For more information about the Household Economy Approach at <http://www.hea-sahel.org>



especially important considering the lead-times required to get supplies to land-locked regions in the Sahel, and overcome the supply constraints regarding specialized nutrition inputs. Some donors, notably DG ECHO, DFID and OFDA, mobilized resources early and scaled up their funds to support the response. This helped some partners secure resources early-on and establish a regional response plan on the assumption of some principal response choices, such as WFPs blanket supplementary feeding program with Targeted Food Assistance (cash/vouchers) and supplementary nutrition products and UNICEF's program to treat Severe Acute Malnutrition based on annual caseload calculations. This also helped encourage some countries that lacked humanitarian response experience (such as Senegal, Mauritania, Mali, Cameroon, and Gambia) - to pro-actively assesses the situation and consider adequate response options.

15. Further investment in understanding market systems, and behavior of traders is needed, in order to better understand why cereal prices were (and remain) high this year and identify scope for action.
16. In many areas, resources were mobilized and the first wave of operations started relatively early (Niger), although absorption capacity and logistical constraints (especially for Chad and Niger) severely hindered a larger early response.
17. Some agencies identified a critical time span in November and between February and May for early intervention, much earlier than the peak of the lean period due to start in April-May 2012. Injection of food (Chad) and cash (Niger) during these periods was an important mitigation measure to limit destitution, sale of productive assets and dependence on usury money lending. In November 2011, the Mauritanian government organized subsidized food sales through a network of field shops. It highlighted that it was important to link assistance to family agricultural and livelihood calendars to inject resources at critical times and increase the impact. This requires knowledge of cropping and cash flow calendars, and existing studies should therefore be shared in the region.
18. The levels of global and severe acute malnutrition in the Sahel were alarming prior to the 2012 crisis and have deteriorated even further. Nutrition specialists highlighted that malnutrition jeopardizes child brain development, physical growth, hinders social capital production and reduces the capacity of individuals, families and communities to improve their livelihood.
19. Several initiatives, like DG ECHO Sahel Plan, REACH (UN agencies and government structures) and SUN are attempting to address these systemic issues. There are complemented by nutrition operations that support health centers, community based therapeutic feeding and additional distribution mechanism ranging from general food distribution to targeted supplementary feeding.
20. Multi sectoral coordination, especially area-based inter-agency coordination with local authorities is essential to tackling these multiple causes. There are multiple causes of a nutritional crises and food stress is only one of them. Health, water and sanitation, reproductive health and child care practices are equally important and investing only in the food and nutrition component of a response is largely insufficient. There are unfortunately

too few experiences of multi-sectoral interventions, and sectoral coordination hinders the development of area based strategies. At the field level, the cluster approach should give prominence to this coordination modality. At the national level, the pilot multi-sector and inter-agency initiatives such as UNDP/HC project in eastern Chad and the joint resilience building project that UN agencies are launching in Mauritania will provide useful lessons.

21. Increased attention needs to be paid to better targeting of livelihood interventions to ensure that poor households indeed benefit from the proposed interventions. In the Sahel, poor households tend to depend on daily wage labor and do not draw their main sources of food and income from on-farm activities. Indeed, it is in the major production areas, such as southern Niger and Mali, where both chronic and acute malnutrition rates are highest and large segments of the population are extremely poor. Large debts with local traders oblige the rural poor to sell their crops even before the harvest takes place and keeps them in poverty. Long-term investment in social safety nets and support to markets and rural employment are needed to rebuild the resilience of these poor households that make up more than 50% of the rural population.
22. A number of quick impact projects were highlighted that helped reduce the impact of the coming food shortage, at relatively small costs, such as destocking and support to market gardens in Mauritania and early cash transfers in Niger. These interventions diminished the impact of the crisis and were much less expensive than later responses. These were implemented with resources from the Central Emergency Response Fund for UN agencies (for instance for FAO in Mauritania), from the Disaster Rapid Response Fund (DREF) for the Red Cross and Red Crescent societies or through flexible but ad-hoc coordination with donors to redeploy other funds. These quick projects should be more systematic, and therefore need a timely and predictable source of funds. The proposed creation of ERFs in Niger and Mauritania are good initiatives, which should be supported.
23. In Sahel, the experience in early cash transfer and livestock emergency programming is uneven and could easily be boosted to help the system be better prepared for the next drought crisis. Interesting experiences took place in Mauritania and Niger.
24. Agencies often made specific efforts to ensure that distributions were fair and that the aid distributed was used optimally. This was often done by targeting women (in Mauritania, WFP targeted women specifically for its cash transfer program), who are recognized as the most stable element of the family. Yet, this did not prevent redistribution within or outside the family remit. It should however be reminded that these redistributions mechanisms are often the expression of societal solidarity and the aid system has to be very careful in not imposing mechanisms that could weaken traditional safety nets.
25. The diversity of status within the population (refugees, IDP, host populations) impacts the response: In areas where there are refugees or displaced people (Chad, Mali, Mauritania), the way to address their needs in the midst of the food crisis has to be thought through carefully, with the clear caution on avoiding tensions with affected local communities and avoid targeting based on status of population. In addition, there was a clear risk in diverting scarce human and financial resources dedicated to the food crisis

response to this political crisis that benefits from CNN effects and mobilised more easily larger resources.

### **B.3. Scaling up of the response**

26. Several studies across the whole area, (such as WFP/ SAP surveys in Niger and Chad including an estimation of future caseload, HEA Outcome analysis in Mauritania, Mali and Burkina; as well as increasing admission numbers to feeding centers) highlighted the growing magnitude of the food and nutrition crisis in April-June 2012. While the rising admission numbers could be attributed to the increased coverage of nutrition programs, there is no doubt that the situation started to rapidly deteriorate with more people entering the hunger gap.
27. Scaling up programs to reach the revised targets after the last series of surveys of April and May often proved difficult. In countries like Chad Niger, the logistical and supply chain is long and complex (for Chad, the Cameroon corridor was clogged quickly and the Libyan Corridor totally closed). It proved difficult to launch multi-sectoral responses of sufficient size.
28. The local procurement of food was limited due to large scale needs and the regional nature of the crisis. The production of Ready to Use Therapeutic Food (RUTF) from the “plumpy family” rapidly reached its limits, and supply was thus constrained by availability. Here more than anywhere else, proactive procurements made by agencies as soon as the first early warning signals were produced, strong coordination between agencies and the decision to use more than one supplier ensured that the supply chain held.
29. Cash transfers were used to prevent destitution and allow access to markets, but in different ways and at different scales depending on the country. NGOs (ACF, OXFAM, CRS) and WFP have been setting up pilot programs and in Niger scaled up significantly recently. Constraints linked to capacity of banks and mobile networks were overcome by working through local traders, as seen in Chad and Mauritania. Experience shows that market analyses are critical to target cash programming (see the experiences developed as part of the Cash Learning Project - CALP). There was good coordination of cash transfer programs in Niger, and harmonized timing of the transition from non-conditional to conditional cash transfers. These programs helped mitigate long term indebtedness.
30. Agencies implemented agricultural and livestock interventions at several stages of the crisis. At the end of 2011, early seed distributions in some areas helped support the dry season cropping systems (water receding and irrigated cereal and forage production, small scale gardening) and contributed to reduce the impact of the unfolding food crisis, while some other interventions, such as off season maize production in Burkina Faso were reported to be less successful. The “twin track approach” implemented by many NGOs, the IFRC and ICRC in which food, seeds and tools are distributed to simultaneously counter malnutrition, protect household assets and kick off production was locally a critical ingredient of the response. While these types of interventions do not directly benefit the most vulnerable segments of the populations, which often have no access to land and are

often not in the capacity to engage in agricultural practices, they nevertheless contribute to the betterment of the food security in the area.

31. Once again, some sectors were much better resourced than other, with food aid getting most resources, while other key sectors extremely crucial for both survival and resilience building, such as health and WASH were largely underfunded. The way that data is sometimes presented in which cash, food and agriculture are sometimes presented together does not capture the importance that should be given to the agriculture, pastoral and livelihood sector and how ill funded this resilience-essential sector is.

#### **B.4. Information management, advocacy, monitoring and evaluation**

32. Information management is crucial to decision making, resource mobilization, monitoring, program steering and accountability. Significant efforts have been made with producing data and analysis in a consistent manner and to communicate it through meetings, report sharing and even dedicated web pages.
33. Concerted advocacy based on joint assessments and analysis was successful in some countries, that were had more experience with these situations (Chad and Niger). In other contexts, there is still a lack of consensus on the gravity of the situation, how long it will take for the community to recover and what the top priorities should be for action.
34. Different assessment methodologies and “entry points” exist, each with their own distinct advantages and disadvantages, and inter-agency dialogue and strategic planning; experience and understanding of the context are critical to make informed choices. In this context, it is very difficult to elaborate a meaningful regional communication strategy and, at times, even a country communication strategy.
35. The need for evidence based decision making is well understood. Yet data collection and treatment is costly and time consuming, while decisions have often to be made on the basis of information that is far from perfect. Yet, the frequently late delivery of survey or assessment results hinders proper decision making and planning efforts. Rather than classical longitudinal epidemiological studies, better utilization of Outcome Analyses exercises drawing information coming from food security monitoring data, such as “sentinel sites” using a limited number of indicators (qualitative and quantitative) would allow faster support to educated choice and informed decision making.
36. It is important that system goes beyond need assessment and enhances its investments in context, capacity and constraints analyses. Large investment in HEA baseline profiles across the region can be considered as a major advancement since the 2005 crisis, in helping understanding rural livelihoods.
37. Leadership is critical in orienting the operations on the basis of previous experiences and the “level of optimal ignorance”<sup>7</sup> in which only the information required is sought to make a decision. Donors and agencies should encourage courageous early decisions to be made on a “no regret” basis, and not criticize if the course of events is different.

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<sup>7</sup><http://opendocs.ids.ac.uk/opendocs/bitstream/handle/123456789/865/rc291.pdf?sequence=1>  
<http://www.dwml.net/words/notes.htm>

38. A major breakthrough was achieved in March 2012 at the occasion of the PREGEC meeting in Abidjan to make the regional Cadre Harmonisé food (and, normally/ progressively, nutrition) security analysis method a regular participative process amongst main technical stakeholders, led by CILSS technical committee and including FEWS NET, AGRHYMET, UN, INGO, RC technical staff and analysts as well as the IPC Global Support Unit in Rome. It allowed for the first technical/objective/ transparent consensus maps on situations and 3-month forecasts in 6 Sahel countries in the region. CILSS has meanwhile joined the IPC GSU, allowing for an evolving CH tool towards international standards/ IPC 2.0 methodology.

### **B.5. Security and conflict hinder response**

39. Operating in this previously stable Sahel belt is becoming more and more complex. While the situation is improving in Eastern Chad, the effects of the Libyan crisis (return of migrants and mercenaries, as well as flow of arms of all kinds), the ongoing crisis in Mali (which triggered large scale displacements of populations within and across borders) and the increasing instability in Northern Nigeria are creating high levels of uncertainty which affects the presence of international actors, access to the field and to affected populations.
40. In all countries of the Sahel region, security assessment and contingency planning efforts are ongoing among governments and international actors to prepare for the worsening of the situation in Mali and neighboring border areas. These necessary exercises unfortunately drain critical capacities from the recovery efforts to the security sector and managing these increased risks have significant cost implications.
41. The impact that the planned ECOWAS military intervention has will depend on how long it will take ECOWAS Forces to execute their mission. Different scenarios have to be looked into, from a rapid solution to a complex and protracted conflict.
42. The capacity to respond to the possible humanitarian consequences of this conflict and the recovery efforts after the 2011-2012 food crises will be largely framed by the working conditions induced by these developments and by the status of the related humanitarian space.

### **B.6. Learning from the crisis**

43. Learning from the crisis will be critical. Crises offer opportunities to review factors of vulnerability and evaluate responses and what to do differently to prevent, mitigate and respond better. No opportunity to learn should be lost.<sup>8</sup> The current mission should be seen as a step in a much more developed learning process. There are many ways to learn on crisis response and resilience strengthening activities: country level and regional lesson sharing workshops and exchanges, as those organized by ROWCA or by the Cash Learning Project are all proofs that it is feasible and useful.

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<sup>8</sup> “The only way we can pay tribute to those who lost their life in the tsunami is by demonstrating that we are able to learn from this drama and are able to use all these lessons to make our work safer.” H.E. The Minister of Health of Thailand, March 2005.

44. This situation did not qualify as a Level III crisis (despite its complexity, its magnitude and geographic coverage across nine countries) and thus did not trigger in an automatic way a real time evaluation or review. Learning mechanisms for this type of crisis should be further developed and refined.
45. Some interventions on the treatment of malnutrition included an element of research on the performance, efficacy, cost-effectiveness and impact of large operations on the reduction of mortality and morbidity. Early results seem promising, notably in Niger where the coverage and roll-out of these actions were relatively high.

### **C. Towards resilience: from risk informed programming to build back safer strategies**

46. The debate on what “resilience” means and how this emerging concept can help shape the response both strategically and operationally is very much alive, with more questions than solutions. A “theory of change”, or “causality chain” might be required, rather than a single definition. A systemic model, allowing a better understanding of the crises (production, availability or access crisis), of the pillars of resilience (at the individual, household, country and system) and of the different interactions within the system will permit the linkage between better prevention, more effective preparedness, relevant response, strategic support to recovery and risk informed development. There is also significant agreement that a resilience approach is especially suited to the chronic vulnerability and exposure to multiple shocks of communities in the Sahel.

#### **C.1. Acting with a systemic approach and a system wide commitment**

47. Actors involved in the response highlighted that the current discussions and momentum around resilience is a vital opportunity to better integrate programming and coherence of humanitarian and development responses, and address institutional constraints.
48. Context matters: “one size fits all” approach to be avoided. The region is marked by a series of commonalities and differences. The similarities are largely related to the roots of food and nutritional insecurity (poverty, aridity, climate change, pastoral-agriculture interactions, etc.) while there are large differences in the operational environment due to diversity of the quality of governance and engagement of States, logistical constraints and the requirements for large food distribution in insecure regions, experience in humanitarian action and related absorption capacities.
49. Diverse socio-economic and agro-ecological settings and large differences in how well markets function requires different and appropriate response modalities. In some areas, cash transfers might be the optimal solution, in other less so and direct food aid or vouchers might be more appropriate, depending on how well markets function and community access to cash. Specific solutions for farming communities, pastoral groups and the vast agro-pastoralist community should be identified and implemented. Investments in better understanding of market systems have taken place across the region

by major agencies (WFP, Oxfam, FEWS, CILSS) using different tools, such as EMMA,<sup>9</sup> which provides emergency market mapping and analysis. This needs to be further strengthened as systems are becoming increasingly complex and are not yet well enough understood.

50. Build on what already exists. Many interventions in the region are directly or indirectly linked to prepare, better respond and help people to recover from crises. The first steps on the road to “resilience friendly programming” have been largely explored, but the rise of the word in recent months opens new ways to think about coordination, to design multi-dimensional interventions and to re-explore the links between DRR, the humanitarian response, the recovery from crisis and risk informed development.
51. Speed and timeliness are essential. Early response helps mitigate the impact of the crisis and prevents destitution and selling of assets. Early mitigation efforts in 2011 and early 2012 proved effective and efficient to not only reduce suffering but also the cost of relief and recovery. While the UN system can rely on the CERF Rapid response window, there is nothing similar for NGOs to access. The creation of Emergency Relief Funds as a general feature of the HC tool box in “at risks areas” would help ensure readily available funds for early mitigation activities, and consolidate coordination structures. Initiatives in Mauritania and Niger to establish ERFs should be supported.
52. Managing the crippling effects of a nutrition crisis requires sustained commitment. The fact that the prospects for the 2012 harvest look relatively favorable does not mean that households have completely recovered. The needs of the most destitute are likely to be very high into 2013. Many will continue to feel the negative effects of this crisis for an extended period, as destitution and indebtedness will hinder their recovery for at least another year, if by chance they are not affected by another crisis.
53. The rural/urban conundrum is an emerging challenge. Crises in the rural sector often trigger rapid and sometime irreversible movements to the urban centers, increasing the burden on often fragile city slums. This issue is very rarely mentioned in context of the current crisis in the Sahel belt while it has been a decisive phenomenon in previous droughts. It is being addressed only on an experimental scale in some countries, such as Mauritania, and should be further explored and the medium to long term repercussions properly analyzed, with the support of UN-HABITAT.
54. Increase the exposure of key stakeholders in the Sahel to experiences in other similar arid areas: Exposure of government officials for West Africa to mechanisms such as safety nets in Ethiopia, destocking programs in Kenya and Cash transfer in the Horn might help broadening the tool box of solutions they can envisage. Understanding better the innovative approach developed in the Horn by donors, such as the new USAID “driver of crisis” program or the SHARE initiative of the European Commission will also help countries from Sahel to improve their own practices. South-south cooperation offers great opportunities to develop effective and resilient aid mechanisms.

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<sup>9</sup> For more information on the emergency market mapping & analysis: <http://emma-toolkit.org/>

## C.2. Linking the crisis in Sahel with the development agenda

55. The rise of the ‘R’ word in recent years opens new ways to think about coordination, to design multi-dimensional interventions and to re-explore the links between disaster risk reductions, the humanitarian response, the recovery from crisis and risk informed development. Actors in the region see the current momentum around resilience as an opportunity to strengthen these links and address institutional barriers that impede coherence between development and humanitarian programming.
56. Resilience is a multi-level and multi-stakeholder endeavor. This resilience has to be addressed at the individual, household, and community levels. Resilience building international projects and well prepared national institutions play a critical part. A resilient international system should be able to prevent and reduce structural and socio-economic vulnerabilities, anticipate possible risks and deliver humanitarian aid on time, and then also proactively link the emergency response with the recovery phase. The aid system needs to ensure a systemic, multi-dimensional, multi scale and multi-stakeholder approach.
57. Proactive interaction between humanitarian aid and development is crucial. There are increasing efforts to ensure that planning goes beyond the short term funding framework. The AGIR-Sahel initiative, the UN Sahel Resilience plan and agency specific strategies will be milestones in that direction. Development donors should however be engaging more strategically with humanitarian actors, to ensure continuity in the operation, good transmission of experience and contact and, optimally better resilience. The on-going process in the 11<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund indicates importance changes<sup>10</sup> that should translate to better joint humanitarian and development programming.
58. Pro-resilience government strategies should be supported by development agencies and donors. The 3N program in Niger, the recently prepared rural strategy in Chad and the EMEL program in Mauritania are important national initiatives that should help framing the international response.
59. Medium term planning for humanitarian action in areas of recurrent and chronic crises is a new track explored by several countries teams: The 3 year strategic CAP planning process in Chad is another important exercise by which a longer term vision supports the yearly fundraising efforts of the annual CAP.
60. Multi-stakeholder coordination is vital. The importance given in the Transformative Agenda<sup>11</sup> to better link the humanitarian sector, national institutions and development donors is another key step towards building system-wide support for resilient communities and institutions while ensuring that effective and principled humanitarian action remain at the forefront. This applies as well to the donors who are making important efforts to coordinate between themselves.
61. Risk informed development programming is an integral component of resilience building. In a region affected by complex hazards ranging from recurring, slow onset to localized

<sup>10</sup> [http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/agenda\\_for\\_change\\_en.pdf](http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/what/development-policies/documents/agenda_for_change_en.pdf)

<sup>11</sup> <http://www.humanitarianinfo.org/iasc/pageloder.aspx?page=content-template-default&bd=87>



rapid onset crises, development programs should ensure proper prevention and risk mitigation. Better dialogue between humanitarian agencies, well aware of the factors of fragility in their respective areas of work, and development actors is needed to increase the proactive inclusion of risk analysis in the definition of development strategies and programs. Specific joint efforts by development and humanitarian agencies should ensure that the UNDAF process becomes much more “risk informed.”

62. Multi-level security food stocks can help alleviate price variations and can speed up the response at the local level. Village and country food security has historically been based on storage at the village and country level. These mechanisms have been left aside for many complex reasons, including financial needs for families in a monetized economy and national level structural adjustments, but need to be revitalized. However, due to complex markets, further investment is needed to understanding the functioning of key markets, especially the cereal market, as well as the behavior of traders.
63. Safety nets can play a key role in addressing acute poverty and critical levels of food insecurity. Experiences in several countries in Africa and Asia underline the importance of social safety nets to prevent the most vulnerable and at risk populations from falling between the cracks and to reducing the nutritional vulnerability that hinders opportunities to get out of poverty. A resilience strategy for Sahel should build on the pilots in the region (Niger and Mauretania) and other experiences of social safety nets to develop these mechanisms across the Sahel region.
64. The capacity of national agricultural research to produce technical solutions to make agriculture production, storage and processing more resilient should be strengthened. Agricultural research and support services were reduced significantly due to structural adjustments, and these capacities must, depending on the country, be rebuilt or strengthened significantly to support resilient agricultural and pastoral systems.
65. The humanitarian system should be more dynamic in reminding the development community of its responsibility in building resilience. Risk informed programming should become a rule, rather than an exception. The UNDAF itself should take better account of the numerous factors of risks and ensure that multi-hazard analysis influence development models.
66. Development of local production of Ready to Use Therapeutic Food (RUTF), micronutrients and supplementary food can contribute to a more efficient response. The region has a rich in potential to produce RUTF locally to address malnutrition. Not only will this reduce the dependency on external markets, but it will also stimulate local production and contribute better to resilient response systems. Existing efforts are already underway in Niger and Burkina Faso, and efforts made by agencies like UNICEF and FAO in these areas should be scaled up significantly.
67. Supply chain bottlenecks for RUTF and vital inputs (essential drugs, reproductive health supplies, etc.) remains a challenge in the region and impedes regular service delivery at the community level and effective emergency response. Improving national and regional logistics systems will help ensure more reliable and cost-effective service delivery. This will help program performance and avoid disastrous shortages of life saving supplies.

Investing in these systems, in view of the sustained needs and in the context of resilience building for immediate and longer-term needs is a sound and practical investment.

68. Family planning and the management of demographic growth needs to be re-emphasized in development planning and programs.<sup>12</sup> For a long time, when mortality rates were high due to the absence of health systems, resilience at the family level in the Sahel was largely based on the number of able bodied adults and arms to perform agricultural tasks. In the 21<sup>st</sup> century, as mortality rates have fallen due to progress in public health, there is a need to support families to space and plan births better. This will enable mothers to re-cover, and increase the likelihood that limited resources can be targeted on infants in the crucial first years of development. Smaller families are also easier to properly feed and care for. The absorption capacities of services (especially health and education), the carrying capacity of agro-ecosystems and the employment opportunities created by the economy at large cannot cope with the current demographic growth where population increase immediately offsets economic progress.
69. It is important that the resilience debate and focus on mid-to-long term action does not come at the expense of required resources for urgent needs (due to a flawed understanding of the resilience concept, which recognises a concurrent need of immediate and longer term action). Coherent communication and advocacy will be especially important in light of the attention that will be focused on the potential conflict in Mali and other crises in the region.

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<sup>12</sup><http://www.afd.fr/webdav/site/afd/shared/PORTAILS/PAYS/TCHAD/PDF/Etude%20dividende%20d%C3%A9mographiq%20finale.pdf>

## Annexes

### Annex n°1: Terms of reference

**Lesson Learning Review**  
**Early Action and Resilience Activities in the Sahel**  
**Mission Dates: 1 November to 17 November**

#### Introduction and Objectives

In recognition of the late response to the 2011 drought in the Horn of Africa, governments and humanitarian organizations in the Sahel were determined to take early action before the peak of the 2012 nutrition crises in the Sahel. Additionally, during the response, organizations and governments have, to varying degrees, promoted and used resilience building activities.

Building resilience is central to bring lasting change for people in countries affected by chronic or cyclical crises. The concept of resilience has become central to the humanitarian and development discourse, particularly in relation to emergencies associated with recurrent or protracted food insecurity.

The IASC Principals have agreed to focus their annual meeting in December 2012 on preparedness and resilience. A review of lessons from the early action taken and the resilience approach in the Sahel, and the response to the Horn of Africa crisis should inform this debate.

Given the short time-frame to prepare for this discussion, the Regional Humanitarian Coordinator (RHC) for the Sahel, proposed a light review be carried out. As the resilience strategy for the Sahel was just finalized August 2 2012, the light review will focus on the advocacy, preparedness and early action activities undertaken beginning in November 2011. The team will also review on-going resilience building activities to highlight good practices, lessons and challenges.

The objectives of the review are as follows:

- 1) Identify lessons related to the advocacy, preparedness and early action activities. .
- 2) Clarify options for conducting more in depth Real Time Evaluations (RTEs) or other inter-agency reviews and evaluations at the regional and country level.
- 3) Inform the Principals for their planned discussion on preparedness and resilience in December 2012.
- 4) Provide lessons and recommendations for the 2013 planning at the regional and country level.

#### The review will provide feedback around the following key questions:

##### *Early Warning, Early Action and Preparedness*

What advocacy, preparedness and early action activities were undertaken in the Sahel, and were they appropriate?

Are the different coordination mechanisms for early warning and early action appropriate, and linked to humanitarian and development planning?

To what extent did these mechanisms lead to, or support preparedness and resilience initiatives at regional and national levels?

##### *Strategy*

Does a short term humanitarian response strategy exist, and is it linked with medium and long term development approaches for the region?

Is the strategy appropriate and to what extent is resilience building integrated into the strategy? What are the lessons from developing the resilience strategy?

What value added does the resilience approach bring to the regional coordination and the response?

What performance framework are organizations using to measure the effectiveness of resilience interventions?

How does resilience programming support activities and strategies by governments?

***Coordination***

What value added do regional coordination mechanisms bring? Has it promoted co-ordination, especially regarding the interaction between humanitarian and development approaches?

Does the resilience approach lead to actual changes on the ground in terms of coordination and collaboration between humanitarian and development partners as well as a change in programming and implementation?

***Resilience Building***

Do humanitarian organizations factor resilience considerations in their programmes?

Do programs and activities reflect the recommendations developed by the recommendations of the regional task force on resilience building?

Have humanitarian interventions undermined community resilience or coping strategies?

How are national capacities strengthened during humanitarian programming?

***Partnership***

How has the response and resilience approach considered or involved the private sector in planning and programming, especially regarding pricing, access to markets, etc.?

***Lessons, Best Practices and Learning***

What are key lessons learned and best practices in resilience building programming?

What are key lessons learned and best practices in resilience building activities?

What is the appropriate timeframe to measure and review the effectiveness of resilience strategies or resilience building interventions?

**Staffing and Methodology**

A two person team composed of an independent team leader, and an OCHA staff member will carry out short missions to Dakar, Mali, Mauritania, Burkina Faso, Niger and Nigeria over a two and a half week period. The methodology will be both light and rapid to generate useful lessons with minimal footprint. A maximum of desk research will be conducted in advance, as well as preparatory meetings to – among other things - identify key stakeholders to be interviewed. The RHC, his staff, regional and national representatives/heads of HCT members, donors, the Red Cross Movement, NGOs, civil-society, and national/government stakeholders will be consulted. Where possible, beneficiaries will be interviewed as well. The team will adopt a participatory approach, undertaking outreach and communications activities throughout to ensure effective uptake and lesson learning.

**Timing**

Field visits: Mission to the region – interview and visit period	
Field Missions to Dakar, Mauritania, Niger and Chad	Nov 1-17
Dakar: Presentation of findings to the Regional Directors Team and the RHC.	Nov 16
Submission of Paper: to IASC Principals by the IASC Secretariat in preparation for their meeting of 13 December.	23 November

**Management and Reporting**

The review is commissioned by the RHC, and approved by the ERC. It will be managed by OCHA's Evaluation and Guidance Section in consultation with the IASC Secretariat. The RHC will set up a small Steering Group at the Regional Level to review the results. The review team will report to the RHC who will have final ownership of the paper.

## **Annex n°2: Itinerary of the mission**

- 01/11/2012: Departure from France and New York
- 02/11/2012: Meetings in Dakar  
 Meeting with Sahel Team  
 Meeting with UNICEF Senegal Office  
 Meeting with FAO Senegal Office  
 Meeting with RC/HC Senegal  
 Meeting with Regional Directors meeting  
 Meeting with OCHA Regional Office for West and Central Africa  
 Meeting with OXFAM  
 Meeting with DG ECHO
- 03/11/2012:  
 Meeting with OCHA Regional Office for West and Central Africa  
 Meeting with Sahel team  
 Meeting with DG ECHO
- 04/11/2012: Travel to Ndjamena
- 05/11/ 2012: Meetings in Ndjamena  
 Meeting with OCHA  
 Meeting with DG ECHO  
 Meeting with French Embassy
- 06/11/2012: Meetings in Ndjamena  
 Meeting with UNICEF  
 Meeting with FAO  
 Meeting with WFP  
 Meeting with ACF
- 07/11/2012: Meetings in Ndjamena  
 Meeting with Minister of Agriculture  
 Meeting with Comité de Coordination des ONG (CCO)  
 Meeting with UNHCR  
 Meeting with OXFAM  
 Debriefing with OCHA team
- 08/11/2012: Travel to Lome
- 09/11/2012 Travel to Niger  
 Meeting with OXFAM regional resilience adviser  
 Meeting with IOM
- 10/11/2012: Meetings in Niamey  
 Meeting with OCHA  
 Meeting with Inter cluster coordinators and some NGOs  
 Meeting with National Authorities (3N, SAP, CCA)  
 Meeting with RC/HC  
 Travel to Dakar
- 11/11/2012 Travel to Nouakchott  
 Meeting with OCHA  
 Meeting with HCT
- 12/11/2012 Meetings in Nouakchott  
 Meeting with OCHA  
 Meeting with UNDP  
 Meeting with AECID  
 Meeting with French Red Cross
- 13/11/2012 Meetings in Nouakchott  
 Meeting with Minister of Economic Development  
 Meeting with EMEL project Coordinator  
 Meeting with FAO  
 Meeting French Embassy

## 14/11/2012 Field visits and meetings

- Green Belt of Nouakchott (with FAO)

- Meeting with UNICEF Nutritionist

- Meeting with ACF

- Visit to WFP Cash transfer programme in Nouakchott periurban area

- Meeting with Resilience Task Force

- Debriefing with RC/HC and OCHA

## 15/11/2012

- Meeting with IFRC

- Meeting with USAID

- Meeting with OCHA Regional Office for West and Central Africa

- Meeting with Regional Humanitarian Coordinator

## 16/11/2012

- Meeting with Regional Directors

- Meeting with NGOs

- Meeting with Agriculture and resilience Adviser, Prime Minister Office, Senegal

## 17/11/2012

- Meeting with DGECHO regional team

- Finalization of Draft 1 of the mission report

- Departure

### **Annex n°3: List of people met**

#### **Sénégal**

1. Dr. Moussa Bakhayokho, Technical Advisory to the Prime Minister of Senegal
2. David Gressly, Regional Humanitarian Coordinator for Sahel, United Nations
3. Terry Carney, Head of Emergency Operations, Disaster and Crisis Management, Sahel, IFRC
4. Paul Sitman, Regional Emergency Coordinator for West Africa, World Vision
5. Frances Charles, Regional Humanitarian Advocacy Advisor, World Vision
6. Thomas Yanga, Regional Director for West Africa Bureau, WFP
7. Manuel Fontaine, Deputy Regional Director, West and Central Africa, UNICEF
8. Ibrahima Aidara, Country Economist, Senegal, UNDP
9. F. Bintou Djibou, Resident Coordinator, United Nations, Senegal
10. Mensah Leon Y.A. Aluka, Regional Coordination Specialist, UN Development Group for West and Central Africa
11. Francois-Corneille Kedowide, Regional Evaluation Adviser, Regional Centre, UNDP
12. Mr Ndong Jatta, Regional Director, UNESCO
13. Bartane Frattazuolo, Regional Programs Coordinator, ACF WARO
14. Mercy Manyala, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA Sahel Team
15. Elise Ford, Sahel Humanitarian Policy Lead, Oxfam
16. David MacDonald, Deputy Regional Director, Oxfam
17. Jerome Bernard, Regional Food Security and Livelihoods Adviser, Save the Children
18. Victor Bushamuka, Head of Office, Joint Planning Cell, USAID
19. Luca Riegger, Regional Emergency Preparedness and Response Officer, WFP
20. Jose Luis Fernandez, Coordinator, Sub-regional Emergency and Rehabilitation Office – West Africa/Sahel
21. Armand-Michel Broux, Regional Conflict prevention and Recovery Specialist, UNDP
22. Allegra Baiocchi, Head of Office, Regional Office for West and Central Africa, OCHA
23. Noel Tsekouras, Deputy Head of Office Regional Office for West and Central Africa, OCHA
24. Jan Eijkenaar, Coordinator for Sahel and AGIR, ECHO Regional Office
25. Katey Shane, Food for Peace Advisor, USAID
26. Giovanna Barberis, Country Representative, Senegal, UNICEF
27. Amadou Outtara, Country Representative, Senegal, FAO
28. Cheikh Gueye, Deputy Country Representative, Senegal, FAO
29. Belinda Holdsworth, Sahel Team Leader, OCHA

#### **Chad**

30. Dieudonné Bamouni, OCHA Head of Office, Chad
31. Cavid Cibounga, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA, Chad
32. Jane Lewis, ECHO, Technical Assistant
33. Christèle Amigues, Humanitarian Correspondant, French Embassy de France, Chad
34. Marianne Tinlot, FAO, Food Security Consultant, Agriculture Engineer
35. Bruno Maés, Representative, UNICEF
36. Rémy Courcier, Coordinator, Emergency Agriculture and Rehabilitation, FAO, Chad
37. Germain Dasyla, Representative, FAO, Chad
38. Alice Martin-Dahirou, Country Director, WFP
39. Raphael Chuinard, Head of Programs, WFP
40. Jacques Terrenoir, Country Director, Action Contre le Faim, Chad
41. Aboubakar Ourdre Ousta, Secretary General, Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, Chad,
42. Dime Adoum, Agronomist, Minister, Minister of Agriculture and Irrigation, Chad
43. Elisabeth Penco, Coordinator, NGO Coordination Committee, Chad
44. Aminata Gueye, Representative, UNHCR, Chad
45. Jean-Bosco Rushatsi, Assistant Representative, UNHCR, Chad
46. Emilio Huertas, Country Director, Oxfam, Chad
47. Christian Munezero, Responsable des Programmes d' Action Humanitaire – Oxfam, Tchad
48. Pierre Péron, Information Management Officer, OCHA

**Niger**

49. Fode Ndiaye, UN Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, Niger
50. Védaste Kalima, Deputy Head Of Office, OCHA
51. Moïse Ballo, Team Leader, VAM, WFP
52. Michel Diatta, Business Development Manager, World Vision
53. Odile Bulten, Emergency Specialist, UNICEF
54. Kirgni Bassirou, Chargé de Communication des Urgences, WHH
55. Madeleine, Resilience Expert, Sahel Region, Oxfam
56. Erik Ponsard, Country Director, ACTED
57. Abdourahmane Mahaman, Technical Assistant, Emergnecies, VSF-Belgique
58. Malam Dodo Abdou, Coordinator, Save the children
59. Hassane Hamadou, Member, Anidev, Anidev
60. Boureïma Sadou, Administrator and President, Anidev
61. Olivier Eyenga, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA
62. Robertine Sanvura, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA
63. Nouhou Mamadou, Chief of Crisis Response, Food Crisis Cell, Gov. of Niger
64. Kimba Alfari Moumouni, M&E officer of the Permanent Secretary of DNP-GCA, Gov. of Niger
65. Diallo Mamadou Aliou, M&E officer of the Food Crisis Cell, Gov. of Niger
66. Oumarou Amadou, Chief of the Early Warning System Unit, Gov. of Niger
67. Baoua Issoufou, Chief of the Management and Crisis Reduction Unit of the Early Warning System, Gov. of Niger
68. Barkiré Bourahima Gabdakoye, Technical Counselor of the High Commissioner of the 3N Initiative, Gov. of Niger
69. Adamou Nafoga, Chief of information and statistics, Early Warning System, Gov. of Niger

**Mauritania**

70. Dr. Coumba Mar Gadio, UN Resident Coordinator, Humanitarian Coordinator and UNDP Resident Representative, Mauritania
71. Souleman Boukar, Principal Economist, UNDP
72. Sandrine Flament, Head of Mission, Action Contre le Faim (ACF)
73. Ruth Jaramillo Blasco, Deputy Coordinator General, of the Spanish Cooperation in Mauritania
74. Francisco Sancho Lopez, Coordinator General, of the Spanish Cooperation in Mauritania
75. Jean-Bosco Mofiling, Humanitarian Affairs Officer, OCHA
76. Patrick Vercammen, Emergency and Disaster Risk Management Coordinator, FAO
77. Sidi Mohamed Ould Khattry, Councillor, Prime Minister's Office, Islamic Republic of Mauritania
78. Rudolphe Poirier, Attache, Cooperation and Governance, Humanitarian Correspondent, Cooperation and Cultural Action Service, French Embassy
79. Alain Olive, Environmental Program Officer and Humanitarian Focal Point, UNDP
80. Emmanuelle Huchon, Head of Delegation, French Red Cross, Mauritania
81. Xavier Huchon, Sahel Regional Food Security Expert, French Red Cross
82. Lucia Elmi, Representative, UNICEF
83. Dr. Mamadou Ndiaye, Nutrition Manager, UNICEFF
84. Loubna Benhayoune, Head of Office, OCHA
85. Anselme Sadiki, Deputy Resident Representative Programme a.i., UNDP
86. Dr. Baptiste Jean Pierre, Representative, WHO
87. Blandine Bihler, Coordination Officer, United Nations